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MIXED MEDIA: POPULAR CULTURE AND RACE
AND THEIR EFFECT ON JURY SELECTION
Andrea D. Lyon*
INTRODUCTION
It is a tautology to say that the media affects how we perceive
crime, the accused, and the players 'in the criminal justice system.1
Many have decried media portrayals of criminality, particularly in cer-
tain demographic groups defined by age, gender, socioeconomic sta-
tus, and race.2 The purpose of this Article is not to repeat those
poignant and important observations, but rather to assume them to be
true and ask what this means for the practitioner trying to pick a jury
while representing someone facing the death penalty.
Selecting a jury in a capital case is difficult enough, but facing the
issue of race and its insidious symbiotic relationship with the business
of news 3 makes jury selection even more complex. Jury selection in a
capital case is far more complicated and difficult than in an ordinary
case.4 It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully discuss the nega-
tive effects of death qualification, or how excluding people opposed to
the death penalty increases the likelihood of conviction and decisional
errors.
5
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research assistant, Elizabeth Turillo, for her invaluable assistance.
1. See R. Lance Holbert et al., Fear, Authority, and Justice: Crime-Related TV Viewing and
Endorsements of Capital Puninshment and Gun Ownership, 81 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. 0.
343 (2004); Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death
Penalty, 1 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 585 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 1, at 587.
3. Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-
Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 447 (2006); Tracey L. Mc-
Cain, The Interplay of Editorial and Prosecutorial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the
Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 601, 603 (1992).
4. See Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for the Men-
tally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 701 (2008);
ANDREA D. LYON ET AL., ILLINOIS CAPITAL DEFENSE MOTIONS MANUAL (2d ed. 2005); Andrea
D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REV.
695 (1991); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Life-or-Death Case, LITIG., Winter 2006, at 45.
5. See, e.g., Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death
Qualification Process, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984); see also Craig Haney, Examining
Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984).
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In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court initially
held that the prosecution in a capital case has the right to exclude, for
cause, anyone who could not consider giving the death penalty.6 Sub-
sequent cases7 modified Witherspoon's "automatic" and "unmistaka-
bly clear" language,8 allowing the exclusion for cause only when a
juror unqualifiedly expressed his unwillingness to consider the death
penalty.9 This modification changed the dynamics of jury selection by
making it easier for the prosecution to exclude jurors for cause, but it
also complicated matters. First, jurors who are "substantially im-
paired" by virtue of their anti-capital punishment views must be iden-
tified.10 Second, jurors who are "substantially impaired" by virtue of
their pro-capital punishment views must also be identified.'1 Third,
venire members who are substantially impaired in considering lawful
mitigating evidence must be identified. 12
In addition to the defendant's right to an adequate voir dire to per-
mit the identification of unqualified jurors, the Constitution affords a
defendant in a capital case the right to an impartial jury for trial and
capital sentencing. 13 Selecting an impartial jury is a laudable but diffi-
cult goal. The news and entertainment portrayals of racial groups fur-
ther complicates this task because of their effect on jurors'
perceptions. 14 While courts have often stated their concern with racial
6. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
7. See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
8. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
9. Compare Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515 n.9, 522 n.21, with Adams, 448 U.S. at 45 ("prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror" (emphasis added)), and Wain-
wright, 469 U.S. at 424 ("standard is whether the jurors' views would 'prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror"' (emphasis added)).
10. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
11. Id. at 729 (venire must be questioned regarding pro-capital punishment, potentially dis-
qualifying views).
12. Id. at 738. "Presumably, under today's decision a juror who thinks a 'bad childhood' is
never mitigating must also be excluded." Id. at 744 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; Morgan, 504 U.S. at 727 (majority opinion).
14. Adam Hime, Life or Death Mistakes: Cultural Stereotyping, Capital Punishment, and Re-
gional Race-Based Trends in Exoneration and Wrongful Execution, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
181, 209 (2005); Franklin D. Gilliam Jr. et al., Where You Live and What You Watch: The Impact
of Racial Proximity and Local Television News on Attitudes About Race and Crime, 55 POL. RES.
0. 755, 757-59 (2002).
[Vol, 58:681
MIXED MEDIA
prejudice, particularly in the context of jury selection,15 judicial
"fixes" have proved ephemeral. 16
II. POPULAR CULTURE'S EFFECT ON PERCEPTION
If you ask most people where they get their information about the
criminal justice system, they won't say newspapers, civics class, or
even news magazines. Instead, they will say the local news and televi-
sion programs, particularly the ubiquitous and long-running Law &
Order television program and its spinoffs.17 These programs have pre-
dictable qualities to them-there is a victim, a bad guy (the "perp"),
and the forces of good who arrest or exact revenge on him.18 The bad
guy is defined solely by the act with which he is charged, not as a
person who is both good and bad, or hateable and loveable. The vic-
tim is similarly more than one thing, 19 but she has a chance of being
portrayed as something more than the recipient of criminal wrong-
she might be an honor student, or the mother of five, or a long time
factory worker.20 Portrayals in the news are no different. 21
While no one deserves to be violently attacked, those who are at-
tacked are not always without some fault or participation in what hap-
pened to them. For example, a person who is robbed at gunpoint is
the victim of an awful crime that should be punished. It is relevant to
our understanding of the crime, however, that the victim was flashing
money around in a poor neighborhood while buying drugs. It doesn't
mean he "deserved" to be robbed-no one does. Where he is and
what he is doing is not irrelevant, however. Similarly, it is relevant
that the robber was a twelve-year-old breadwinner for a family of
15. Beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and continuing through McCles-
key v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme Court has struggled with this issue, acknowledg-
ing in McCleskey that the statistical evidence "indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate
with race." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312. Declining to overturn an entire capital sentencing sys-
tem due to this improper influence, the Court has attempted to tackle the problem in other ways.
Principal among them is requiring special procedures in jury selection. See generally Turner v.
Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
16. Andrea D. Lyon, Naming the Dragon: Litigating Race Issues During a Death Penalty Trial,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1647, 1654-55 (2004).
17. Connie L. McNeely, Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System: Television Imagery and
Public Knowledge in the United States, 3 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 1, 3-5, 10 (1995),
available at http://www.albany.edu/scj/jcjpc/vol3isl/perceptions.html.
18. David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Pub-
lic Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 785, 809 (1993).
19. Paul Colomy & Laura Ross Greiner, Making Youth Violence Visible: The News Media and
the Summer of Violence, 77 DENv. U. L. REV. 661, 672-73 (2000).
20. See generally Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense
Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims' Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645 (2003).
21. Colomy & Greiner, supra note 19, at 672-73.
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seven children, with his thirteen-year-old sister as the primary care-
taker. There were no adults on the premises-the various fathers
were uninvolved with the children, and the mother was an addict. I
represented this young man later in his life after he was (forcibly) re-
cruited into a gang.22 Did he commit a crime? You bet. Did his vic-
tim's actions contribute to his choice of victim? Absolutely.
III. JUROR "SCRIPTS"
When a juror comes into a courtroom, he does so with certain
scripts in his head.23 His life experiences, upbringing, and education
all help him to function in the world, and that means that he expects
certain events to happen a certain way.24 If the elevator light shows
"up," one expects that the elevator is going up.
Similarly, the potential juror walks in to a courthouse with expecta-
tions about crime, courts, and criminals. However, such life exper-
iences, upbringing, and education are not necessarily where he gets
those expectations. In all likelihood, he has little or no contact with
the criminal justice system personally, has not studied it in school, and
was not brought up around people with personal or educational
knowledge about it.25 Where will those expectations come from? His
experiences will come from the news and television crime drama.
26
Even assuming a juror has no particular political viewpoint about
crime, has no hidden agendas, and is otherwise a blank slate, social
science tells us that he will believe "dark is dangerous,' 27 police al-
ways get the right guy, and prosecutors are knights in shining armor.28
Even if this hypothetical juror intellectually knows better, the only
stories he has heard on the subject are from news and television, al-
most certainly not from his own experience or that of anyone close to
him.
So this potential juror will not know that a young black man from a
tough neighborhood learns early to run whether or not he has done
22. To protect his privacy, I choose not to use his name.
23. SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS: FROM ONE JUROR'S TRIAL PERCEPTIONS TO THE
GROUP'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 119 (Lexis Nexis Group 2004); Richard K. Gabriel, Val-
ues, Beliefs, and Demographics in Selecting Jurors, ATLA-CLE, Winter 2002, at 49.
24. See generally, SUNWOLF, supra note 23.
25. Harris, supra note 18, at 786.
26. Id.; Ray Surette, The Media, the Public, and Criminal Justice Policy, 2 J. INST. JUST. INT'L
STUD. 39, 43 (2003).
27. Beale, supra note 3, at 459.
28. Sarah Eschholz, Crime on Televison-Issues in Criminal Justice, 2 J. INST. JUST. INT'L
STUD. 9, 9-11 (2003).
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anything wrong.29 The juror will not experience a rite of passage to
adulthood in which his father or mother explained to him how to be-
have when (not if) he is stopped by the police-to not make any sud-
den moves and use the words sir or ma'am to avoid getting shot.30
He won't know of anyone doing someone else's time, or how easy it is
to be mistaken for someone you are not.31 In other words, a potential
juror's life history will not help him to look critically at the news or
crime drama, and he likely will be unaware of its effect on him.32
IV. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS
What does a defense attorney do under these circumstances? First,
she must conduct voir dire effectively and make good use of whatever
information she gets. In accordance with a defendant's right to an
impartial jury and to identify unqualified jurors during voir dire, an
attorney should "ascertain sufficient information about prospective ju-
rors' beliefs and opinions so as to allow removal of those members of
the venire whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that they
cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance with their oath."'33 A
capital prosecution demands that exacting standards be met to ensure
that the entire process is fair. The "fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment gives rise to a special 'need for reliability in the de-
termination that death is the appropriate punishment' in any capital
case."'34 Both parties need access to information concerning the po-
29. Mia Carpiniello, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard For
"Location Plus Evasion" Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 357-70 (2001); Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 367, 455-70 (1996). But see California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,623 n.1 (1991). Justice
Scalia criticized the State's concession "[t]hat it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry,
young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police" as it is "not self-evident,
and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense." Id. (citing Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee
when no man pursueth.")).
30. WANDA M. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING 75 (1999).
31. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the
Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 79 Ky. L.J. 259, 260 (1991).
32. Kimberlianne Podlas, As Seen on TV: The Normative Influence of Syndi-Court on Con-
temporary Litigiousness, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ErNT. L.J. 1, 19-23 (2004).
33. People v. Cloutier, 622 N.E.2d 774, 781 (Ill. 1993). See also Michael P. Toomin, Jury Selec-
tion in Criminal Cases: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431-A Journey Back to the Future and
What it Portends, 48 DEPAUL. L. REV. 83 (1998); McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 554-55 (1984).
34. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
363-64 (1977) (White, J., concurring)).
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tential jurors that is accurate and thorough.35 It is an established prin-
ciple that "the juror's assurances that he is equal to this task [of laying
aside preconceptions] cannot be dispositive of the accused's rights. '36
Thus, the court must allow a probing inquiry into the juror's beliefs
and prejudices. Moreover, the exceptional and irrevocable nature of
the death penalty demands that an attorney must conduct voir dire
carefully, as a trial court's refusal to allow certain voir dire questions
requires reversal of the death sentence.37
A capital defense attorney therefore must ask for attorney-con-
ducted voir dire, a questionnaire, and adequate time to question ju-
rors. She must also learn to find out what people think, why they
think it, and how deeply their opinions run. Studies consistently show
that a lawyer is far more likely to get good information from jurors if
she asks questions herself; thus, it is important to request attorney
participation in voir dire in every case.38 A good questionnaire will
also help to get information from the juror that he or she might be
unwilling to say in public. 39 For example, a person who has a negative
view of criminal defense attorneys may be unwilling to say so to a
criminal defense attorney, but will likely answer honestly on a ques-
tionnaire. Additionally, the questionnaire will narrow the focus of the
in-court questioning and save time.
While the trial court has the primary responsibility for examining
prospective jurors and has the discretion to dictate the manner and
scope of voir dire,40 those procedures must simply provide a reasona-
ble assurance that prejudice, if any, would be discovered to uphold the
court's exercise of discretion in accepting or excusing that juror for
cause.41 Of course, getting good voir dire is only the first step. Know-
ing what to do with it is the real challenge. How does one go about
35. See United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1998) ("It is a basic requirement
of due process that a defendant in a criminal case receive a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
indifferent jurors." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120,
122 (6th Cir. 1995).
36. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975).
37. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
38. Lee Smith, Voir Dire in New Hampshire: A Flawed Process, 25 VT. L. REv. 575, 580-82
(2001).
39. Steven K. McCallister & Kieran J. Shanahan, Jury Selection, 33397 NBI-CLE 38, 43 (2006)
(noting that most people indicate that their greatest fear is public speaking).
40. People v. Williams, 645 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ill. 1994); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 423,
451 (1991).
41. People v. Peeples, 616 N.E.2d 294, 311 (Il. 1993); Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109,
1112-15 (9th Cir. 1981).
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discovering hidden biases, especially if those biases are largely
unconscious?42
This is where the questioner needs to be patient, listen well, and ask
for specifics. For example, if I were to ask a potential juror if she
considers crime to be a major problem in our country and that juror
were to answer affirmatively, what do I really know? I know the con-
clusion, but I don't know why this particular juror has drawn it. Does
she think crime is bad, or does she see a lot of it on the news? Does a
family member rant about it all the time, or is she related to a law
enforcement officer? Is the potential juror a victim herself? I would
need to ask why and then get the story underlying the reason to deter-
mine not only what may have happened in this juror's life to cause her
to come to this conclusion, but how deep her conviction runs.43 If this
is a person who has been deeply scarred by violent crime, and I am
defending a death penalty prosecution, this may not be the right case
for that particular juror.44 Similarly, as questioners, we must avoid
jumping to conclusions ourselves. A person who likes to read murder
mysteries or watch horror movies is not, as a result, bloodthirsty, or a
thrill-seeker. 45 You have to ask good questions, and more impor-
tantly, listen to the answers.
V. CONCLUSION
Jury selection in a capital case is a daunting endeavor, and discern-
ing the scripts and biases of the potential jurors in voir dire might
appear at first glance to be impossible. By being aware of these influ-
ences in our own lives and creating and taking advantage of good voir
dire, however, questioners can explore what influences potential ju-
rors. Practitioners can thus give a capital defendant the chance to be
judged on the merits, rather than by the stereotypes of our society.
42. Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 227-28 (2005).
43. 1 JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2:27 (2d ed., 2007).
44. People v. Johnson, 575 N.E.2d 1247, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
45. Molly Stuart, Using Psychological Measures to Avoid Impermissible Classifications Under
Batson, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 423, 441-42 (1998).
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